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THE NEW-HOUSE IMPLIED WARRANTY
COMES TO ILLINOIS-
PETERSEN V. HUBSCHMAN CONSTRUCTION CO.
In response to complaints by new-house consumers, 1 American courts
have begun to limit the application of the doctrines of caveat emptor 2 and
merger 3 in the sale of new homes by builder-vendors. 4 Caveat emptor is a
common law maxim, predicated on an arm's length bargain, providing that
the purchaser buys at his or her own peril. 5 In the context of the sale of
new homes, however, modern courts have recognized that the assumption of
an arm's length bargain is no longer appropriate. 6 Changes wrought by the
1. Defects in new houses have become a primary source of consumer's complaints. See
U.S. Dept. of Consumer Affairs, A Study of New Home Construction Problems in Fairfax
County (1979). Census data concerning the incidence of serious structural deficiencies is avail-
able only for the 63.4 million non-farm housing units. These units are broken down into 37.9
million owner-occupied units and 25.4 million renter-occupied units. Seven million (18%) of the
owner-occupied non-farm units contained one or more structural deficiencies. U.S. DEPT. OF
COMMERCE, ANNUAL HOUSING SURVEY: 1976, Tables A-I, -6, -10 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
1976 SURVEY]. The specific types of defects selected by the Census were limited to patent
defects and only those latent defects that were unequivocally manifested. Specifically, the de-
fects consisted of signs of leaking roofs and basements; open holes or cracks in interior walls,
ceilings, and floors; broken plaster; and peeling paint on interior walls and ceilings. Id.
2. See note 5 and accompanying text infra.
3. Merger is the extinguishment of one contract by its absorption into another. BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 891 (5th ed. 1979). For further discussion of merger, see notes 11 & 12 and
accompanying text infra.
4. For years commentators have encouraged the courts to abandon caveat emptor in the
sale of new homes by the builder-vendor. One early writer predicted the end of caveat
emptor. Dunham, Vendor's Obligations as to Fitness of Land for a Particular Purpose, 37
MINN. L. REV. 108, 125 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Dunham]. The earls, theories of recovery
used by the courts and their subsequent development has been outlined in: Bearman, Caveat
Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV. 541, 543, 576-79
(1961).
A majority of American courts have responded to the demise of caveat emptor by recognizing
an implied warranty of habitability in the sale of new homes by the builder-vendor. McNamara,
The Implied Warranty in New-House Construction Revisited, 3 REAL ESTATE L.J. 136 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as McNamara].
5. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 202 (5th ed. 1979).
The doctrine of caveat emptor first appeared in the common law during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. It was prevalent among traders in England's rural markets. See Hamilton,
The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emiptor, 40 YALE L. J. 1133 (1931) [hereinafter cited as Hamilton];
Comment, Caveat Emiptor in the Sales of Real Property-Tinie for Reappraisal, 10 ARIZ. L.
REV. 484 (1968).
Adherence to caveat emptor resulted in a rule that attached no liability to the seller when the
buyer had a reasonable opportunity to inspect the property. Failure to inspect or discover a flaw
resulted in the vendee's loss. See Roeser, The Implied Warranty of Habitability in the Sale of
New Housing: The Trend in Illinois, 1978 S. ILL. L.J. 178, 179 [hereinafter cited as Roeser].
6. See, e.g., Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 1096, 449 S.W.2d 922, 924 (1970); Conyers
v. Molloy, 50 I1. App. 3d 17, 19, 364 N.E.2d 986, 988 (4th Dist. 1977). See Roberts, The Case
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industrialization of the building industry and assembly-line techniques in
construction have brought tract development and mass production to new-
house construction. 7 As the custom-made house has been replaced by the
tract home, the arm's length bargain has been replaced by the standardized
mass contract or adhesion contract. 8 The transaction between vendor and
purchaser is no longer a product of give and take; rather, the consumer must
adhere to the terms prescribed by the builder. 9 Under these cir-
cumstances, strict adherence to the doctrine of caveat emptor has had harsh
consequences for new-house consumers and has been harmful to the indus-
try itself. 10
Because of the vendee's loss of bargaining power, the operation of merger
has had especially harsh consequences for the purchaser. Under the merger
of the Untvary Homne Buyer: Tile Housing Merchant Did It, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 835, 837 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Roberts], where the author wrote:
Caveat emptor, however, did not adversely affect the typical buyer of a new home
during the nineteenth century. In those days, after all, the home-owner-to-be was
commonly a middle-class fellow who purchased his own lot of land and then re-
tained an architect to design a home for him. Once the plans were ready the land-
owner hired a contractor who built a house according to the plans. Quality control
was assured because the builder was paid in stages. . . .If the house did happen to
collapse, the homeowner had a choice of lawsuits to recoup his losses: either the
plans were defective, in which case the architect had been negligent, or the build-
ing job had not been workmanlike, in which case the contractor was liable.
Id.
7. The following figures illustrate the industrialization in the housing industry. The annual
value of the new house construction rose from under 12 billion in 1945 to 57.604 billion in
1973. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, CURRENT CONSTRUCTION REPORTS, VALUE OF CONSTRUC-
TION PUT IN PLACE C30 (1974).
Not including mobile homes, there are 74 million occupied housing units in the United
States. Of these, 22.1 million, or approximately 30%, were built since 1967. These figures
represent an average of 1.9 million units per year. 1976 Survey, supra note 1, pt. A, table A-1.
Although the number of houses built each year has declined slightly since 1976, the number
remains substantial. In 1977, 819,000 new units were sold; in the first 11 months of 1978,
779,000 new units were sold. Trends in Housing Industry, 2 NAHB BUILDER 2 (January 22,
1979).
8. Lenhoff, Contracts of Adhesion and the Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study in
the Light of American and Foreign Law, 36 TUL. L. REv. 481 (1962) where the author states:
In the advanced industrial society, the economic apparatus is no longer focused on
... the particular desires of individuals, but is based on mass production and mass
distribution. This . . . has by necessity become more and more standardized; and
this standardization has its counterpart in standardized forms "for dealing with the
customers. . .. One speaks of the standardized mass contracts or . . . 'contracts of
adhesion' . . not formulated as a result of the give and take of bargaining.
Id. at 481.
9. See Roeser, supra note 5, at 181-82.
10. See Waggoner v. Midwestern Development, Inc., 83 S.D.2d at 65, 154 N.W.2d at 807-
08, where the court stated as follows:
Broad as is the application of the principle of caveat emptor in sales of real estate, a
few courts have been inclined to make an exception in the sale of new housing
where the vendor is also the developer or contractor. . . . It would be much better
if this enlightened approach were generally adopted with respect to the sale of new
PETERSEN V. HUBSCHMAN
doctrine, once the deed is delivered, only those covenants expressly re-
served in the deed are operable. 11 Because of the leverage exercised by
the builder-vendor in contracting for the sale of new homes, however, only
those covenants favorable to the builder-vendor are reserved in the deed. 12
Consequently, the courts, through the implied warranty of habitability,
guarantee what the purchaser, through the lack of bargaining strength, cannot
expressly obtain.
The Illinois Supreme Court recently addressed the issues of implied war-
ranty of habitability, merger, and caveat emptor in Petersen v. Hubschnan
Construction Co. 13 In Petersen, the court recognized, for the first time, an
implied warranty of habitability in the sale of new homes. In so doing the
court restricted the doctrine of caveat emptor in the sale of realty and
bridged the gap between the law protecting the purchaser of goods 14 and
the law imperiling the purchaser of improved real estate.
This Note discusses Illinois' experience with the implied warranty of
habitability, focusing particularly on the split among the appellate districts
regarding the new-house implied warranty. Additionally, the Note analyzes
the Petersen decision in two steps. First, it will examine the court's applica-
tion of the implied warranty of habitability; second, it will consider the im-
pact of the court's decision on the scope of the Illinois implied warranty of
habitability. Finally, the Note will criticize the court's overzealous applica-
tion of this implied warranty doctrine, the court's ambiguous rationale, and
the court's failure to provide any clear guidelines for the future application of
the Illinois implied warranty of' habitability.
houses for it would tend to discourage much of the sloppy work and jerry-building
that has become perceptible over the years.
Id.
If the consumer cannot distinguish between a well-built house and a poorly-built house, the
builder who builds poorly by "cutting corners" has a cost advantage over the builder who builds
well. Eventually, the forces of competition will drive the better-built houses out of the market
because the builder of the better home is unable to credibly prove that his or her house is in
fact better built. See generally, Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. OF LEGAL
STUDIES 323 (1973).
11. See Roeser, supra note 5, at 181. Covenants in the contract of sale that are collateral to
the transfer of the deed are exceptions to the merger rule. Collateral promises are those that do
not pertain to title, possession, or quantity of the estate. Today, the term collateral signals a
conclusion already reached. The governing feature of merger is intent, but not the actual intent
of the parties. Rather, it is the intent perceived by reconstructing the transaction on common
sense principles. Consequently, absent an express waiver of rights at the closing, the transfer is
not considered complete performance. See Roberts, supra note 6, at 839.
12. See Roeser, supra note 5, at 181.
13. 76 I11. 2d 31, 389 N.E.2d 1154 (1979).
14. The growth in sales law moved from application of the doctrine of caveat emptor toward
consideration of the buyer's reliance on the seller's representations about products and then to
the construction of implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.
Dunham, supra note 4, at 110.
19801
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AN OVERVIEW OF THE IMPLIED
WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY IN ILLINOIS
The new-house implied warranty of habitability evolved from the implied
builder's warranty that has long been employed in Illinois construction con-
tracts. According to the builder's warranty, a builder who furnishes building
plans impliedly promises that the structure is fit for its intended use and is
constructed in a workmanlike manner. 15 The builder's warranty was im-
posed by law and derived from the tort concept that one who portrays him-
self or herself as possessing a special knowledge or skill must use care in
exercising that special skill or knowledge. 16
The concept of an implied builder's warranty was employed in Weck v.
A: M Sunrise Construction Co., 17 the first Illinois case to discuss merger,
caveat emptor, and implied warranties in the sale of new housing. 18 In
Weck, the Appellate Court for the First District characterized the issue as
whether a builder of new houses was required to deliver a dwelling fit for
habitation. 19 The court relied on a potpourri of construction contract cases
and an English implied warranty case 20 to hold a builder-vendor liable for
15. Economy Fuse and Mfg. Co. v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co., 111 F.2d 875 (7th Cir.
1940); Union Hide & Leather Co. v. Reosig, 48 III. 75 (1868); Butkovich & Sons v. State Bank
of St. Charles, 62 I11 App. 3d 810, N.E.2d 837 (2d Dist. 1979).
In Economy, the defendant was under contract to build a concrete footing to support the
foundation of a building. The footing provided insufficient support, and, as a result, the building
sank and settled causing damage to the plaintiff. The court held the defendant liable for all
damages resulting from the defendant's lack of skill. Economy Fuse and Mfg. Co. v. Raymond
Concrete Pile Co., 111 F.2d at 878-79.
The court explained the builder's warranty as follows: "A ... workman undertaking to con-
struct a piece of work, impliedly warrants that it shall be so constructed that it will be reason-
ably sufficient for the purpose for which it is intended." id. at 878.
16. Economy Fuse and Mfg. Co. v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co., 111 F.2d at 878-79.
17. 36 I11. App. 2d 383, 184 N.E.2d 728 (1st Dist. 1962). In Weck the plaintiffs complained
of leakage through the roof and in the basement, faulty bathroom plumbing, cracked ceiling
plaster, and as a result, the house was not habitable. Id. at 386, 184 N.E.2d at 730. The
defendant argued that because the contract did not contain an express warranty that the
house was to be habitable, merger operated to extinguish the plaintiffs' claim. Id. at 88, 184
N.E.2d at 731. The plaintiffs replied that their complaint in no way varied the terms of the
contract. They argued that the real consideration for the contract was the purchase and sale of a
residence with all appurtenances attached and so constructed as to be habitable. Id.
18. Roeser, supra note 5, at 187. Regarding caveat emptor, the court in Weck proceeded on
the premise that the jury's finding for the plaintiff settled that question. The merger issue was
decided in favor of plaintiff on the grounds that the facts of the case brought it within "the
collateral covenants" exception to the merger rule. Weck v. A:M Sunrise Constr. Co., 36 I11.
App. 2d at 396, 184 N.E.2d at 734.
19. Id. at 388, 184 N.E.2d at 731. The extension of the building warranty requirement of
fitness for intended use to the implied warranty of habitability was a small logical step. The
court reasoned that if a builder is required to erect a building so that when it is complete, it
will be reasonably fit for its intended use, when the building to be built is a human dwelling, it
should be reasonably fit for human habitation. Id. at 396, 184 N.E.2d at 734.
20. The cases relied on by Weck were Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., [1932] 2K.B.
113 (recognized an implied warranty as applied to homes purchased during construction); Laurel
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latent defects in construction on the ground that a builder-vendor impliedly
warrants the workmanlike completion of a dwelling that is purchased during
construction. 21
One year later the Illinois Appellate Court for the Third District, in Cou-
trakon v. Adams,2 2 did not find an implied warranty even though the house
was purchased during construction but was completed when title passed.
2 3
The Coutrakon court incorrectly distinguished Weck on the grounds that
Weck involved a contract requiring the builder-vendor to build in accord-
Realty Co. v. Himelfarb, 194 Md. 672, 72 A.2d 23 (1953) (collateral agreements are not merged
in the deed); Weinberg v. Willensky, 26 N.J. Super. 301, 97 A.2d 707 (1953) (agreement of a
grantor to complete an unfinished dwelling upon the promises to be conveyed is collateral to
the conveyance); Stevens v. Milestone, 190 Md. 61, 57 A.2d 292 (1948) (collateral agreement
not inconsistent with the deed would not merge).
21. 36 Ill. App. 2d at 389-92, 184 N.E.2d at 731-33.
The new-house implied warranty was initially limited to incomplete houses purchased during
construction because of the implied warranty's link to the construction contract warranty. The
complete/incomplete distinction was derived from the notion that when the house is purchased
during construction, the agreement between the builder-vendor and the purchaser included two
severable contracts, one for the conveyance of land and one for the construction of a dwelling.
Under the contract for construction, the courts impose a duty on the builder-vendor as builder
to construct in a workmanlike manner. Because only the contract to convey is fulfilled by the
deed, merger does not operate to relieve the builder of a collateral agreement to construct the
dwelling. See Note, Elderkin v. Caster - The Pennsylvania Experience with Implied Warran-
ties in Sales of New Homes, 47 TEMPLE L.Q. 172, 174 (1973).
In the sale of a completed house, no implied warranty of workmanship or fitness for use applied
to protect the purchaser of a defective dwelling. The courts reasoned that a completed house
would be provided for by an express warranty before closing. As to latent defects, merger
extinguished any action they would support. See Glison v. Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d
260 (1963); See also Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 32 Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958);
Vandershrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957).
The distinction between houses purchased during construction and those purchased after
completion was abandoned in Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964). As the
court in Carpenter said:
[T]hat a different rule should apply to the purchaser of a house which is near com-
pletion than would apply to one who purchases a new house seems incongruous. To
say that the former may rely on an implied warranty and the latter cannot is recog-
nizing a distinction without a reasonable basis for it.
Id. at 83, 388 P.2d at 402.
22. 39 Il. App. 2d 290, 188 N.E.2d 780 (3d Dist. 1963), aff'd, 31 I11. 2d 189, 201 N.E.2d
100 (1964).
23. In Coutrakon, the purchasers sued for breach of an implied warranty of habitability
when two fires broke out in the utility room after the heat was turned on. The contract for sale
delineated certain construction items that were to be included; but at the time of purchase, the
utility room had been completed and the vendees testified that they did inspect the heating unit
and utility room. Id. at 293, 188 N.E.2d at 782.
On appeal, the vendee relied on Weck and advocated a departure from the general rule that
where there was no express warranty, no liability accrued. Id. at 300, 188 N.E.2d at 785. The
appellate court upheld the doctrine of caveat emptor on the ground that without caveat emptor
real estate transactions would become chaotic. Id. at 304, 188 N.E.2d at 787.
1980]
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ance with a specified plan. 24  Due to this misinterpretation 25 the court
dismissed Weck as a construction-contract case. 26
At this point, there were divergent opinions among the various districts of
the Illinois Appellate Court. The issue was ripe for the Illinois Supreme
Court. The Illinois Supreme Court granted leave to appeal the Coutrakon
decision, but, while noting that the implied warranty of habitability was an
"interesting problem," 27 the court decided the case on evidentiary grounds.
The supreme court's failure to resolve the dispute among the appellate dis-
tricts resulted in the appellate districts' evasion of the issue whenever possi-
ble. 28  When the courts were forced to decide the new-house implied war-
ranty issue, they did so with mixed results. 29 But having been before the
supreme court once, the new-house implied-warranty-of-habitability issue
was not considered there again for several years.
24. Id. at 302, 188 N.E.2d at 786.
25. In hedging on its holding, the appellate court seemed confused by Weck. The court
stated, referring to Weck: "[I]f in the final analysis this is not the basis for the majority opinion,
we are not constrained to follow it." Id.
26. The dissent in Weck had more of an impact on Coutrakon than the majority opinion.
The dissent was based on the usual arguments against the implied warranty of habitability:
caveat emptor, merger, and the complete/incomplete distinction. 36 Il. App. 2d at 397, 184
N.E.2d at 735 (Burke, J., dissenting).
27. 31 111. 2d at 190, 201 N.E.2d at 101.
28. This evasion has resulted in some predictably bizarre rationales. In Ehard v. Pistakee
Builders, Inc., 111 I11. App. 2d 227, 250 N.E.2d I (2d Dist. 1969), the court dismissed the
complete/incomplete dichotomy and criticized the Illinois Supreme Court for avoiding the im-
plied warranty of habitability issue in Coutrakon. Then, ironically, the Ehard court ruled that
the past conduct of the defendant builder in correcting some defects established an express
agreement to correct all the defects. Therefore, the question of an implied warranty of habitabil-
ity need not be reached. Id. at 233, 250 N.E.2d at 4.
An even more bizarre rationale appeared in Garcia v. Hynes & Howes Real Estate, Inc., 29
Ill. App. 3d 479, 331 N.E.2d 634 (3d Dist. 1965). In Garcia, the court appeared to base its
holding on geographical considerations. The redistricting of Rock Island County placed it in the
third appellate district. The result was that the third district had cases on both sides of the
implied warranty issue-Coutrakon and Hanavan v. Dye, 4 Ill. App. 3d 576, 781 N.E.2d 398
(3d Dist. 1972). In Garcia, the court for the third district attempted to solve the problem.
Ignoring the Coutrakon holding, the Garcia court reasoned that because one appellate district
does not control another, the Weck decision from the first district did not bind the third district
when it decided Coutrakon. Id. at 481, 331 N.E.2d at 636. Further, the court noted that Cou-
trakon was decided at a time when Rock Island County was not a part of the third district and
that there was a Rock Island County case that recognized the implied warranty of habitability
- Hanavan v. Dye. The Garcia court reasoned that because Garcia originated in Rock Island
County, the Rock Island County case, Hanavan, which recognized the implied warranty of
habitability, should control in Garcia. Thus the court recognized an implied warranty of habita-
bility. 29 I11. App. 3d at 480-81, 331 N.E.2d at 635-36.
29. See Goggin v. Fox Valley Constr. Corp., 48 III. App. 3d 103, 365 N.E.2d 509 (1st Dist.
1977) (recognized the implied warranty of habitability); Conyers v. Malloy, 50 I11. App. 3d 17,
364 N.E.2d 986 (4th Dist. 1977) (recognized the implied warranty); Hanavan v. Dye, 4 IlI. App.
3d 576, 281 N.E.2d 378 (3d Dist. 1972) (recognized the implied warranty); Narup v. Higgins, 51
I11. App. 2d 102, 200 N.E.2d 922 (5th Dist. 1964) (abstract opinion) (rejected the new house
implied warranty).
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In 1972, in Spring v. Little, 30 the supreme court again confronted the
issues of caveat emptor and the implied warranty of habitability but only as
they applied to residential leaseholds. 31 In Spring, the court recognized
that the traditional analysis of a lease as primarily a conveyance of an interest
in land was an anachronism. 32 The court noted that the urban dweller seeks
not an interest in land but a dwelling suitable for habitation. 33 Based on a
social policy of consumer protection, 34 the court held that the implied war-
ranty of habitability applied to all contracts governing tenancies. 35
Although limited in scope, the implied builder's warranty and the implied
warranty of habitability in leaseholds 36 did serve to inhibit the court's doc-
trinaire adherence to caveat emptor. The extension of similar implied-
30. 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972). In Spring, the tenant alleged that in order to
entice a renewal of the lease, the landlord orally promised to place screens on all of the win-
dows throughout the leased premises, replace rotten window sashes, repair defective electrical
sockets, and redecorate the apartment. When the promised performance was not delivered, the
tenant stopped paying the rent. Id. at 353, 280 N.E.2d at 210. The landlord brought a forcible
entry and detainer action. The defendant theorized that the landlord's failure to properly main-
tain the premises was a defense to the action. The court upheld defendant's argument on the
basis of an implied warranty of habitability. Id. at 366, 280 N.E.2d at 217.
31. Ordinarily, the lease contained no warranty that the leased premises were fit for habita-
tion; rather, caveat emptor was the governing principle of the landlord-tenant relationship. The
policy rationale was premised on the assumption that the tenant inspects the premises and
based on that inspection decides to rent or not. See Groll, Property: Spring v. Little:
Landlord-Tenant Law Approaches the Twentieth Century, 22 DEPAUL L. REv. 51, 55 (1972).
32. 50 I11. 2d at 363, 280 N.E.2d at 215-16 (1972). The landlord-tenant relationship had its
origins in feudal England, an agrarian economy in which land as the primary unit of production
was more important than whatever structure was included in the leasehold.
Id.
33. Id. at 364, 280 N.E.2d at 216.
34. Id. at 365, 280 N.E.2d at 216. The court reasoned that the landlord sells housing as a
commercial businessman and has the greater opportunity and incentive to inspect and maintain
the condition of his building. Further, the tenant must rely on the skill and good faith of the
landlord because the tenant cannot be expected to have the knowledge or capacity to deal with
major structural defects or plumbing or heating problems.
The court was also influenced by the fact that today's city dweller has a single specialized skill
and that he or she is unable to make repairs like the "jack-of-all-trades" farmer who was the
common law's model of the lease. Id. at 364-65, 280 N.E.2d at 216.
35. Id. at 365, 280 N.E.2d at 216. Especially important was the urban tenant's position of
reliance on the skill and integrity of the landlord. The court noted that the increasing complex-
ity of modem dwelling places combined with the unsophisticated tenant's inability to make
adequate inspections and decide for himself or herself whether they are reasonably fit renders
the tenant utterly dependent on the landlord. Id.
36. As applied to leaseholds the implied warranty of habitability is fulfilled by substantial
compliance with the applicable building and housing codes. Id. at 366, 280 N.E.2d at 217. This
rule was derived from the principle that compliance with local laws is a contractual condition
implied by law. See Schiro v. W.E. Gould & Co., 18 I11. 2d 538, 547, 165 N.E.2d 286, 291
(1960). It follows that in the context of the contract for the sale of a new home, a failure to
comply with applicable building codes would constitute a breach of the new-home implied war-
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warranty protection to new-house consumers seemed a small step. As one
commentator noted, "an enlightened court, presented with a cogent asser-
tion of an implied warranty would . . . abolish the rule of caveat emptor."37
In Petersen, the court did so.
THE PETERSEN DECISION
Facts of Petersen
In April, 1972, the plaintiffs, Raymond and Delores Petersen, entered into
a $71,OQO contract with the defendant, Hubschman Construction Co., for the
purchase of a parcel of land and for the construction of a new house on that
land.38 As the closing date approached, a dispute arose concerning certain
aspects of the construction that plaintiffs contended were unfinished or un-
satisfactory.9 The defendant agreed to repair or correct these numerous
items but failed to carry out this agreement satisfactorily. 40 Testimony at
the trial indicated that although repair of these defects would involve major
amounts of work, they could be remedied. 41  It was not disputed that the
house was at least habitable. 42  The plaintiffs could live in it and it was not
dangerously tnsafe.
ranty. The new-home implied warranty, however, is not limited by the applicable building code
because it is possible for a new home to be in substantial compliance with building codes and
still be uninhabitable for the purposes of the new house implied warranty. See Hanavan v. Dye,
4 II1. App. 3d 576, 281 N.E.2d 398 (3d Dist. 1972).
In Hanavan, the builder constructed a house over an irrigation ditch but did not install drain
tiles. Consequently, the basement flooded periodically. 1d. at 577-78, 281 N.E.2d at 399. The
court held that failure to install drain tiles, even though the building code did not require them,
was a breach of the implied warranty of habitability. Id. at 580, 281 N.E.2d at 401.
37. McNamara, supra note 4, at 141.
38. 76 III. 2d at 35, 389 N.E.2d at 1155.
39. Id. at 36, 389 N.E.2d at 1156. Specifically the defects complained of included "a base-
ment floor pitched in the wrong direction away from the drain, improperly installed siding, a
defective front door and door frame, and deterioration and 'nail popping' in the dry wall in the
interior." ld.
40. Id. at 35-6, 389 N.E.2d at 1156.
41. Id. at 36, 389 N.E.2d at 1156.
42. Id. The court's use of the term habitable here is confusing because later in the opinion
the court noted that the term habitability is misleading in that it lacks definiteness. Id. at 41,
389 N.E.2d at 1158. The court's point is well taken, as no clear definition of habitable has been
formulated. For example, in Spring v. Little, the implied warranty of habitability was an aflfirm-
ative defense to an unlawful detainer action. Spring v. Little, 50 11. 2d 351, 366, 280 N.E.2d
208, 217 (1972). Ironically, however, the tenant was both living in the apartment and claiming
in court that it was legally uninhabitable. Clearly, the term means more than that humans can
merely survive in the house. Because, according to Petersen, the warranty is to insure that the
house is fit for its intended purpose, the standard might more logically be "reasonable comfort."
See 76 I11. 2d at 40, 389 N.E.2d at 1158. Of course, this standard is also indefinite and courts
might easily differ in their interpretations of reasonable comfort. See Comment, Washington's
New Home Implied Warranty of Habitability - Explanation and Model Statute, 54 WAsH. L.
REV. 185, 206 (1978).
[Vol. 29:617
1980] PETERSEN V. HUBSCHMAN
The plaintiffs refused to close the transaction unless a $1,000 escrow ac-
count was established with funds "held back" from the balance due defend-
ant at closing. 43 The defendant, however, refused to close on this basis and
when the plaintiffs refused to accept the house, the defendant invoked the
forfeiture provision in the contract. The defendant notified the plaintiffs that
they had relinquished both the $10,000 deposit and approximately $9,000
worth of labor and materials supplied by the plaintiffs. a4
Plaintiffs brought suit contending that defendant was not entitled to re-
pudiate the contract or to declare a forfeiture. 45 In a peculiar inversion of
positions, 46 the defendant-builder replied that the house conformed to the
requirements of the implied warranty of habitability and, therefore, plaintiffs
must close. The plaintiff-purchaser contended that Illinois did not recognize
an implied warranty of habitability, and alternatively that even if Illinois did
recognize such a warranty, it did not apply to this case.47
The trial court ruled "that there were 'defects in substance' in the con-
struction of the house;" 4 8 the defendant had not substantially performed and
consequently could not declare a forfeiture. 49 Further, the court held that
the plaintiffs were entitled to rescind 50 the contract and recover the earnest
money and the value of the labor and materials they had provided. 51 The
Appellate Court for the Second District affirmed but ruled, without elabora-
tion, that the implied warranty of habitability did not apply. 52
43. 76 I11. 2d at 36, 389 N.E.2d at 1156.
44. Id. Petersen was a plumbing contractor. He agreed to supply the labor and materials for
the plumbing and ventilation systems in the house in exchange for an offset in the contract
price. Brief for Appellee at 10.
45. 76 Il1. 2d at 36, 389 N.E.2d at 1156.
46. Ordinarily, the buyer pleads a breach of the implied warranty of habitability to recover
for latent defects in the construction of the new house, while the builder-vendor urges that by
reason of caveat emptor or merger there is no warranty which the purchaser can assert. 76 I11.
2d at 36-37, 389 N.E.2d at 1156.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 36, 389 N.E.2d at 1156.
50. 76 I11. 2d at 45, 389 N.E.2d at 1160 (1979). Rescission is rarely sought by disgruntled
new-house consumers because the market forces in real estate operate to substantially increase
the value of the property between the time of contracting and the time of closing. Under these
circumstances when a purchaser rescinds he or she actually suffers an economic loss. See Sub-
urban Tribune, Aug. 16, 1979, at 12, col. 3.
51. 76 Ill. 2d at 36, 389 N.E.2d at 1156 (1979).
52. 53 I11. App. 3d 626, 631, 368 N.E.2d 1044, 1048 (2d Dist. 1977). The appellate court
ruled that the governing principle in the case was simply that "a party cannot have the benefits
of a contract unless he also performed the obligations." Id. at 630-31, 368 N.E.2d at 1047. The
court then stated in a conclusory remark that the issues of implied warranty of habitability and
substantial performance are distinguishable. Id. at 631, 368 N.E.2d at 1048.
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The Petersen Opinion
Faced with these facts the Illinois Supreme Court held that in the sale of
a new house by the builder-vendor an implied warranty of habitability53
arises 54 that will support an action against the builder-vendor by the vendee
for latent 5 5 defects. 56 The court was especially influenced by the pur-
chaser's substantial reliance on the builder-vendor's skill and integrity. 57
The court noted that the vendee has little opportunity to inspect, that the
vendee is making a major investment, and that he or she usually is not
familiar with construction practices. 5 The court determined that under
these circumstances the vendee has a right to the benefit of the bargain-
the vendee has a right to expect to receive a house that is fit for use as a
53. Although the court used the term implied warranty of habitability, it was troubled by
the term "habitability." See note 43 supra. Consequently, throughout this Note the author uses
the terms "implied warranty of habitability" and "new houses warranty" interchangeably.
54. 76 Il1. 2d at 41, 389, N.E.2d at 1158. The court states that the implied warranty arises
by execution of the parties but this is misleading because it implies that the new-house implied
warranty is a contract or sales warranty. See Note, The Strict Tort Liability of Builder-Vendors,
28 OHIO ST. L.J. 343, 348 (1967). The actual nature of the new house implied warranty, how-
ever, is a combination of the doctrine of strict liability in tort and sales warranty doctrine.
Young and Harper, Quaere: Caveat Emptor or Caveat Venditor? 24 ARK. L. REv. 245, 267-68
(1970).
The landmark case in the application of strict liability principles to the implied warranty of
habitahility is Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). In Schipper,
the defendant failed to install mixing valves, a common protective device, in the house water
system. Instead, the defendant merely installed mixing type faucets and warned purchasers that
the water svstem produced extraordinarily hot water and that the cold water should always be
turned on before the hot. The plaintiffs brought on action when their small son was scalded by
hot water. The court held the builder-vendor liable on an implied warranty of habitability. Id.
at 96, 207 A.2d at 329.
Risk allocation underlies much of strict liability in tort. The policy of risk allocation may have
harh consequences in the new house construction industry because the great majority of new
house construction is (lone by small builders. A builder-vendor of tract homes can bear the risks
of strict liability by spreading the increased costs to his man, customers "whereas a like oppor-
tunity is not available to the typical independent contractor .... " Krause, Products Liability
and the Independent Contractor, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 748, 767 (1964).
Further, the cost of liability insurance coverage could put a small builder-vendor in a non-
competitive position. From a risk-allocation point of view, it might be wise to have the pur-
chaser insure himself or herself. See also Note, Real Property: Builder-Vendors: Liability for Neg-
ligence and for Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability. 51 CORNELL L.Q. 389 (1966).
55. A latent defect is "one which could not be discovered by reasonable and customary
inspection." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 794 (5th ed. 1979).
56. 76 IMI. 2d at 39-40, 389 N.E.2d at 1158-59 (1979). The court also held that a disclaimer
of the implied warranty habitability (lid not violate the public policy of Illinois. The court
stated, however, that any such disclaimer must be conspicuous; it must full' disclose the con-
sequences of its inclusion; and it must be a product of the bargain. Further, boilerplate clauses,
however worded, will be ineffective in the disclaimer. Id. at 43, 389 N.E.2d at 1159 (1979).
57. Id. at 40, 389 N.E.2d at 1158.
58. Id.
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residence. 59 Further, the court held that the implied warranty applied to
the purchase of completed homes as well as to homes incomplete at the time
of contract between vendor and vendee. 60
ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM OF THE PETERSEN DECISION
The Petersen Court's Application of
the Implied Warranty of Habitability
While a new-house implied warranty of habitability is a desirable and
necessary protection for the new-house consumer and the new-house con-
struction industry, the Petersen court's application of the implied warranty
was both peculiar and overzealous. Although the court noted that the im-
plied warranty of habitability was "a judicial innovation used to avoid the
harshness of caveat emptor and merger," 6 1 neither caveat emptor nor
merger were operative in Petersen.
Clearly, merger was not an issue. 62 Merger does not operate until the
deed has been delivered. 63  In Petersen, there was no transfer of the
deed. 64 Caveat emptor was also inapplicable to Petersen because the plain-
tiffs were not yet obligated by the contract.65 Substantial performance by
the defendant was a constructive condition to performance by the plain-
tiffs. 66 Because the material breach by defendant resulted in a failure to
fulfill that condition, plaintiffs' duties under the contract never arose.
67
Thus to invoke caveat emptor in this situation would create a duty of per-
formance where there was no duty by contract.
Because the impediments to recovery under caveat emptor and merger
were absent, there was no need for the court to reach the implied-
warranty-of-habitability issue. Instead there were sufficient and appropriate
grounds under the Illinois defective-performance cases 68 for affirming the
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 38, 389 N.E.2d at 1157.
62. Although merger was not an issue, the court stated in dicta that the implied warranty of
habitability is an independent undertaking collateral to the covenant to convey. Therefore,
merger will not extinguish an action for breach of the new house implied warranty of habitabil-
ity in Illinois. 76 Il1. 2d 31, 41, 389 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (1979).
63. See notes 11-12 and accompanying text supra.
64. 76 11. 2d at 41, 389 N.E.2d at 1158.
65. See Hamilton, supra note 5, at 1138.
66. 76 I1. 21 at 43-44, 389 N.E.2d at 1159.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Kusy v. Johnson, 41 Ill. App. 3d 763, 354 N.E.2d 480 (3d Dist. 1976); Litvin v.
Timbercrest Estates, Inc., 37 I1. App. 3d 956, 347 N.E.2d 378 (1st Dist.); Ehard v. Pistakee
Builders, Inc., 111 I1. App. 2d 227, 250 N.E.2d (2d Dist. 1969). In this line of cases, the
plaintiff-purchaser sued the builder-vendor for material breach of the construction contract. The
builder's duty under a construction contract is that of substantial performance. The sole issue
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lower court's decision granting judgment to the plaintiffs. According to the
defective performance cases, a construction contract imposes a duty of
substantial performance upon the builder rather than one of strict perform-
ance.6 9 Substantial performance of a construction contract to erect a dwell-
ing requires the builder to deliver a house that is suitable to live in. 70
Thus, the Petersen court rested its decision on adequate and appropriate
grounds when it held that substantial performance entitled the plaintiffs to a
house reasonably fit for use as a residence and that the house as constructed
was not so fit. 71 The court should have decided the case on substantial
performance grounds alone and, indeed, the court stated that there was no
substantial performance. 72
Rather than rest the case solely on defective-performance grounds, how-
ever, the court seized the opportunity to resolve the dispute among the
appellate districts 73 and establish new law in Illinois. The court ruled that
the builder's duty to construct a house reasonably suited for use as a resi-
dence was derived from the implied warranty of habitability 74 instead of
from the builder's duty of substantial performance. 7 In applying the new-
house implied warranty, however, the Petersen court disregarded its own
construction of the warranty. According to the court's own explanation of the
new-house implied warranty, the warranty was inapplicable to Petersen. The
court stated that the new-house implied warranty applied only to latent de-
fects that interfere with the purchasers' legitimate expectations. 76 The de-
was whether the builder's work constituted substantial performance of the contract. A finding of
material l)reach permits the purchaser either to rescind the contract or to accept the house
without waiving the right to sue for damages.
69. Ehard v. Pistakee Builders, Inc., 111 Ill. App. 2(d 227, 250 N.E.2d 1 (2d Dist. 1969);
Broncata v. Timbercrest Estates, Inc., 100 Ill. App. 2d 49, 241 N.E.2d 569 (1st Dist. 1968);
Surety Dev. Corp. v. Grevas, 42 I11. App. 2d. 268, 192 N.E.2d 145 (2d Dist. 1963).
70. Surety Dev. Corp. v. Grevas, 42 Ill. App. 2d at 269, 192 N.E.2d at 146. In Surety, the
defendants purchased a prefabricated house based on an inspection of plaintiff's models. The
house was to be completed on September 27, 1961. At 4:00 P.M. on the twenty-seventh, the
purchasers inspected the construction site and found the plaintiff in a crash program to com-
plete the construction. Id. The siding on the house was not finished, the floors were yet to be
installed, and the lot was vet to be graded. The purchaser left the construction site and refused
to return again at 5:30. Id. at 269, 192 N.E.2d at 146. The plaintiff-builder brought suit, con-
tending that 'v 5:30 on the twenty-seventh the house was substantially complete. The court
held fir the plaintiff-builder. Id. at 270-71, 192 N.E.2d at 146. The court stated that although a
service walk, some grading and blacktopping were vet to be (lone, the house was suitable to live
in and that the requirement of substantial performance is satisfied by a house that can be lived
in. Id.
71. 76 I11. 2d at 44, 389 N.E.2d at 1160.
72. 1d.
73. See notes 17-27 and accompanying text supra.
74. Id. at 42, 389 N.E.2d at 1159.
75. The supreme court characterized the case as involving the dual issues of the implied
warrantv of habitability and substantial performance. 76 Il1. 2d at 35, 389 N. E.2d at 1155. The
appellate court, however, distinguished the two issues. See note 52 supra.
76. 76 III. 2d at 42, 389 N.E.2d at 1159.
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fects in Petersen, however, were patent. 77 In fact, the defects were actually
discovered. 78
Ironically, the court was aware that the defects were patent and had been
discovered. 79 The court stated: "[W]e do not decide in this case what the
appropriate remedy would have been if the defects had not been discovered
until after the deed had been delivered." 80  Thus, the Petersen opinion is
ambiguous. On the one hand, the court stated that the new-house implied
warranty applies only to latent defects; on the other hand, patent defects
do not take a case out of the implied warranty of habitability but may merely
limit the remedy.
It appears that the court was actually more concerned with the aggregate
effect of the defects than whether they were latent or patent. The court
suggested that to require the purchasers to accept a house that had "defects
in substance" in its construction would deprive the plaintiffs of the benefit of
their bargain. 81 While the court's construction of the implied warranty of
habitability is a legitimate extension of the scope of the new-house implied
warranty, the Petersen court erred when it ignored its own limitation of the
scope of the new-house implied warranty when it applied the implied war-
ranty in a case involving patent defects. In so doing, the Petersen court
rendered the application of the Illinois new-house implied warranty unclear.
The Scope of the Illinois New-House Implied Warranty
Before applying the implied warranty of habitability, the Petersen court
had to consider the parameters of the implied warranty of habitability as
articulated in Goggin v. Fox Valley Construction Co. 82 In Goggin, the
court distilled from prior Illinois cases four elements to an action for breach
of the implied warranty: (1) the plaintiff must have purchased a new house;
(2) the new house must have contained a substantial defect; (3) the defect
must have been caused by a builder's design, material, or workmanship; and
(4) the defect must have caused the house to be unfit for human habita-
tion. 83 Further, Goggin focused on the application of the doctrine by not-
77. "A patent defect is one which is plainly visible or which can be discerned by such an
inspection as would be made in the exercise of ordinary care.'" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1013 (5th ed. 1979).
78. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
79. 76 I11. 2d at 44, 389 N.E.2d at 1160.
80. 1d.
81. Id. The court stated: "[p]laintiffs contracted to pay for a house reasonably fit for its
intended use, not for a house with substantial defects pius damages." Id. Further, the court felt
it would be unjust to require the purchasers to accept a house in which there were "defects in
substance" in the construction of the house. Id.
82. 48 I11. App. 3d 103, 365 N.E.2d 509 (1st Dist. 1977). In Goggin, the plaintiff sued for
breach of the implied warranty of quality of design, workmanship, and material in the sale of a
new home. The court held that the implied warranty of habitability is recognized in Illinois but
that, in the absence of an allegation in the complaint that the house was not fit for human
habitation, the complaint failed to state a cause of action. Id. at 105, 365 N.E.2d at 511.
83. Id. at 105, 365 N.E.2d at 510-11.
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ing that the real dispute in these cases rests upon a determination of the
types of defects that render a new house uninhabitable. 84 According to
Goggin, a house was uninhabitable if it was unsafe, unhealthy, or failed to
keep out the elements. 85
The Petersen court rejected as too narrow the Goggin configuration of the
implied warranty of habitability. 86 The court stated that a house "merely
capable of being inhabited does not satisfy the requirements of the implied
warranty of habitability." 87  In an effort to establish new parameters of the
new-house implied warranty, the Petersen court analogized it to the Uniform
Commercial Code's implied warranty of merchantability. 88 The implied
warranty of merchantability is based on the idea that merchantability, as de-
fined by the Code, is that for which the parties intended to contract. 89 The
court pointed out that the UCC's definition of an implied warranty would
satisfy the expectations of both parties as to the quality of the house. The
rationale was that the implied warranty of merchantability would protect the
buyer from structural defects9" while protecting the seller from liability for
ordinary and minor defects.
The court's reasoning merely restated the problem. It provided no
guidelines to aid the courts in determining the kinds of defects that will give
rise to an action for breach of the implied warranty. The courts still must
decide which defects are ordinary and minor. Further, the implied warranty
84. Id. at 106, 365 N.E.2d at 511.
85. Id.
86. 76 Ill. 2d at 41, 389 N.E.2d at 1158.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 42, 389 N.E.2d at 1158. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 26, §§ 2-314, -315 (1979).
89. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-314 (1977). See Kessler, The Protection of the Consumer
Under Modern Sales Law, 74 YALE L.J. 262 (1964).
90. See Comment, Washington's New Home Implied Warranty of Habitability-Explanation
and Model Statute, 54 WASH. L. REv. 185, 212 (1978): As defined by the Home Owners War-
ranty Corporation, a structural defect is:
Actual damage to the load-bearing portion of the home-including damage due to
settling, expansion, or lateral movement of the soil-which affects the load-bearing
junction and vitally affects its use for residential purposes .... Examples of possible
major structural defects are major weakening in the home's foundation .... Failure
of beams, joints . . . or other elements of the home's supporting structure ...
Minor structural problems in roofs, such as failure of its structural members.
Home Owners Warranty Corp., HOW Application Booklet 6 (June, 1977) (available from Dep't
of Housing and Urban Development, Wash. D.C.). The Home Owner's Warranty Corp. is an
industry organization, however, and its definition of a structural defect reflects the bias of the
construction industry. Consequently, many jurisdictions disregard HOW's restrictive structural
defects limitation. See, e.g., Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d 88,
114 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1974) (sticking glass doors and poor patio drainage); Griffin v. Wheeler-
Leonard & Co., Inc., 290 N.C. 185, 225 S.E.2d 557 (1976) (failure of top window sashes to stay
up and water underneath the garage door after heavy rains); Elderkin v. Caster, 447 Pa. 188,
288 A.2d 771 (1972) (defective water quality in the well that supplied the house ).
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of merchantability does not apply to patent defects because the basis of the
implied warranty-justifiable reliance-is absent where the defect is
patent. 9 1 Thus, the new-house implied warranty/implied-warranty-of-
merchantability analogy does little to clarify the parameters of the Petersen
warranty. The Petersen court rejected the Goggin configuration of the im-
plied warranty of habitability, but the court failed to replace it with a coher-
ent workable framework of its own.
The courts or the legislature 92 now must clarify the scope of the new-
house implied warranty to determine what quality of realty the builder-
vendor warrants. The Petersen court's statement that the purchaser is enti-
tled to the benefit of the bargain is too vague to be an efficient standard of
quality. The value of realty is based on a combination of many factors includ-
ing land acreage, potential for commercial development in the area, quality
of the neighborhood, landscaping, and the age and appearance of the sur-
rounding buildings. If the purchaser is entitled to the benefit of his or her
bargain, the implied warranty should include within its scope that one factor
that made the property valuable to the purchaser. The courts must articulate
those factors that will be covered by the implied warranty of habitability.
Impact of the Petersen Decision
The ambiguities in the Petersen decision render the ultimate repercussions
of the decision uncertain. The court's application of and reliance on the na-
tional trend, however, indicate that Illinois courts will probably hold the im-
plied warranty to be comprehensive. 93 Although the Petersen court indicated
that certain individual defects may be too insignificant to render a builder-
vendor liable, 94 the aggregate effect of multiple defects would be adequate
grounds for a breach of the implied warranty. 95 It is clear that the bargain-
ing position of the purchaser now is enhanced by the implied warranty, as
the vendee will now receive by implied protection that which he or she used
91. Note, The Strict Liability of Builder-Vendors, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 343, 348 (1967).
92. See note 97 infra.
93. The following is a sampling of the defects involved in the cases noted by the Petersen
court: Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648, 525 P.2d 881
(1974) (sliding glass doors that were sticking and a ceiling that was buckling); Wright v. Creative
Corp., 30 Colo. App. 575, 498 P.2d 1179 (1972) (installation of plate glass rather than safety
glass); Gable v. Silver, 258 S.2d 11 (Fla. App. 1972) (defective air-conditioning in con-
dominium); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 257 A.2d 314 (1965) (defective hot water
system); Yepson v. Burgess, 269 Or. 635, 525 P.2d 1019 (1974) (defective septic tank and drain-
age system); Rothberg v. Olenik, 128 Vt. 295, 262 A.2d 461 (1970) (defective foundation).
94. The Petersen court stated that the vendee has a right to expect "a house that is reason-
ably fit for use as a residence." 76 I11. 2d at 40, 389 N.E.2d at 1158 (emphasis added). The
builder is not required to deliver a perfect house, but in determining whether a house is defec-
tive the test should be one of reasonableness. See Bethlahmy v. Dechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 68, 415
P.2d 698, 711 (1966); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 154 N.W.2d 803, 807-8 (S.D. 1967).
95. See note 81 and accompanying text supra.
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to pay for in the form of an express warranty. As a result of this more equi-
table proportioning of bargaining strength between the vendor and the ven-
dee, specific limits of warranty protection may be established through fair
bargaining.
Clearly, the Petersen decision portends increased liability for the builder-
vendor. 96 For the large builder-vendor, the increased expense will mean
distribution of risk through insurance and higher costs to customers. 97 For
the small builder-vendor, however, the increased production costs and the
cost of insurance may prove to be an intolerable burden. 98 While a broad
and flexible new-house implied warranty is desirable for the purchaser, some
limit on the builder-vendor's liability99 is necessary to preserve competition
96. Questions remain concerning the liability of other parties involved in the sale of a new
home. In the case of a seller who hires a builder, "the rationale of the builder's warranty would
support imposition of liability upon the sellers .... Although the seller does not personally create
defects, he or she is in a position to hire a reputable builder, inspect the work, and demand
repair." Comment, Washington's New Home Implied Warranty of Habitability-Explanation
and Model Statute, 54 WASH. L. REV. 185, 212 (1978). See Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co.,
12 Cal. 3d at 380, 525 P.2d at 91, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 651; Smith v. Warson Dev. Co., 479
S.W.2d 795, 801 (Mo. 1972). One writer suggests that liability should be imposed upon all
sellers regardless of their position to inspect or demand repairs.
Today the implied warranty of merchantability has nothing to do with the special
knowledge or responsibility of the seller of goods. When the local grocer sells a loaf
of packaged bread, he may be described as a merchant with respect to the bread,
but he has no more control over the contents or quality of that bread and no more
knowledge about how bread should be made or packaged than the plumber's wife
who buys it .... The argument that the grocer ... selects his supplier is also
specious in this day of mass advertising and trade-name selling; in fact, the retailer
may not have any idea who the producer of the particular article is .... So any
notion that liability without demonstrated fault should only be imposed upon those
who are knowledgeable about the commodity . . . does not have any significance in
our sales law today, although it seems that such was the origin of the 'merchant'
requirement which still exists.
Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53 GEO. L.J.
633, 649 (1965).
As to lenders, liability may be imputed to them if they are financially tied to a builder. See
Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 369, 73 Cal. Rptr.
369 (1968).
97. See Note, Elderkin v. Gaster-The Pennsylvania Experience with Implied Warranties in
Sales of New Homes, 47 TEMPLE L.Q. 172, 185 (1973). See also Note, Real Property Builder-
Vendors: Liability for Negligence and for Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability, 51 CoR-
NELL L.Q. 389, 396 (1966).
98. See authorities cited note 97 supra.
99. The Illinois General Assembly has moved to limit the builder-vendor's liability via the
statute of limitations. The state legislature is considering HB 1031, which creates a twelve year
statute of limitations on actions brought by new house consumers for defective construction. The
bill passed both houses on June 22, 1979, but it was subjected to amendatory veto on Sep-
tember 14, 1979. The Governor changed the limit from eight years to 12 years in order to
conform with the products liability statute of repose. The statute of limitations will run from the
time the builder-vendor tenders possession of the house to the first buyer.
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in the housing industry. Unfortunately, due to the ambiguity and vagueness
of the Petersen rationale, the ultimate limit and scope of the implied war-
ranty will have to be fashioned through the costly course of litigation.
CONCLUSION
There is nothing in the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability to
render it inapplicable to Petersen. The Illinois Supreme Court, however, ran
roughshod over its own interpretation of the new-house implied warranty.
The court stated that the implied warranty applied only to latent defects, yet
the defects in Petersen were patent. Further, the court noted that the pur-
pose of the implied warranty was to avoid the harsh consequences of caveat
emptor and merger, yet neither caveat emptor nor merger were operative in
Petersen. Nor was Petersen a unique situation requiring judicial innovation;
there were sufficient and more appropriate alternative grounds for awarding
judgment to plaintiffs. Because the Petersen court was making new law it
should have awaited a more appropriate vehicle through which to institute
the implied warranty of habitability. Thus, although Illinois does recognize
an implied warranty of habitability in the sale of new homes by the builder-
vendor, clarity in the law and the ultimate scope of the implied warranty
must await future determination.
Peter Monahan
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